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VENTRILOQUISM
AND THE VERBAL ICON:
A COMMENT ON PROFESSOR HOGG'S
"THE CHARTER AND AMERICAN
THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION"·
BY RICHARD

F.

DEVLIN**

In this brief comment I offer some critical reflections on Professor Hogg's proposed
approach to Chaner interpretation. I suggest that Professor Hogg's attempt to
legitimize and constrain judicial review is an exercise in confession and avoidance.
On the one hand, he admits that "interpretivism" is explanatorily inadequate, yet on
the other he refuses to accept "non-interpretivism" for he realizes that it has the
potential to unmask the politics of law. I argue that Hogg's third way - that Chaner
interpretation should be progressive and purposive - is incapable of bearing the
legitimizing weight which he requires in that it necessitates ahistoricism, circularity
and a retreat into textual objectivism. By way of conclusion, I suggest that we must
abandon the repressive machinations of textual fetishism so that we may honestly
confront the nexus between law, politics and power. In turn, this will enable us
to demand of powerholders - including judges - that they use their power for
democratic rather than mystificatory ends.

*

e> Copyright, 1988, Richard F. Devlin.

**sessional Lecturer, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
Peter Hogg, Brian Slattery, John D. Whyte, Iain Ramsay, and Allan C. Hutchinson all
disagreed with earlier versions of this comment. They bear no responsibility for the infelicities
which remain.
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Neo
jurisprudential discourse are quintessentially political.5
Conservative judges and scholars such as Robert Bork,6 William
Renquist, 7 Raoul Berger,8 and Richard Posner9 have launched a
major broadside against the liberalism of the Warren Court by
arguing that it is fundamentally undemocratic for non-elected judges
to make decisions and advance policies which are neither stated nor
implied in the Constitution. A host of liberals have, in different
ways, risen as champions of the Court by providing a relegitimation
either in substance or process, for activism. 10 The debate, in its
most recent manifestation, has concretized in the quest to develop
, the correct strategy for interpreting the Constitution. Once again,
law manifests itself as an arena for political and ideological
struggle.11

5

One of the main catalysts for the most recent round of debate was the manifestly socio
political problem of the legitimacy of abortion, culminating in the Supreme Court's decision
in Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6

11Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems," (1971) 47 Ind. L.J. 1.

7
11The Notion of a Living Constitution" (1976) 54 Texas L. Rev. 693.

8Govemment by Judiciary (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard U. Press, 1977).
9
1'The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial
Minorities" (1974) Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 1.

10see Laurence Tribe, Constitutional Choices (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,
1985); God Bless This Honourable Court (New York: Random House, 1985); Ronald Dworkin,
Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1986); Owen Fiss, ''The Supreme Court, 1978
Term, Forward: The Forms of Justice" (1979) 93 Harvard L.Rev. l.; John Hart Ely,
Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1980); Michael Perry, The Constitution, the Courts and Human Rights (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1982); Jesse Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process,
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980).
11 R.F. Devlin, ''Tales of Centaurs and Men" (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall L.J. (forthcoming).
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competence, and democratic theory."19 He suggests that the
question of the legitimacy of judicial review is less agonizing for
Canadians than Americans20 and goes almost as far as to suggest
that it is a non-issue. Hogg advances two reasons in support of his
argument. First, the Charter incorporates the democratic safety nets
of sections 1 �nd 33 thereby substantially limiting the undemocratic
threat posed by the judiciary.21 Although I have several reservations
about this claim, it is not the main focus of this comment. Second,
and more important for my purpose, are Hogg's suggestions with
regard to the importance of the interpretation debate for Canada:
the judiciary do not have carte blanche; review is legitimate only if
it is "based exclusively on the words of the constitution"22 which
should be interpreted in a "progressive" and "purposive" manner.
This answer, in Hogg's opinion, is sufficient to constrain the judiciary
and therefore forestall any drift towards the slippery slope of the
legitimacy of judicial review. Politics and law therefore remain
autonomous.
I cannot agree.
Professor Hogg's seemingly modest article is very cleverly
constructed. He argues that "non-interpretivism is nonsense; that
interpretivism is a concept that is useful only in contrast to non
int_erpretivism; and that both terms can safely be banished from
Canadian constitutional theory."23 By demonstrating that both
extremes are absurd, Hogg seeks to carve out a typically Canadian
middle path. Unfortunately, Professor Hogg does not tell us why he
deals with non-interpretivism first. Surely it would be more logical
to deal with the affirmative claims of interpretivism and then

.,.

19
Paul Brest, ''The Fundamental Rights Controversy" (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 1063 at 1064.
20

Hogg, supra, note 2 at 88.

21 Ibid. at 88-89.
22Jbid. at 102.
23
Ibid. at 91.
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with regard to what the judges say, not what they do. To be blunt,
even- in the United Kingdom legislative omnicompetence has been
effectively restricted by a variety of judicial machinations. The
United Kingdom does recognize an implied Bill of Rights.25 More
importantly, through clandestine techniques such as canons of
construction and principles of interpretation, British courts have
frequently negated collectivist Parliamentary policy in favour of
individual liberty and private property.26 The politics of statutory
interpretation are reconstructed and legitimized as innocent and
neutral linguistic analysis. Furthermore, Hogg's argument ignores the
changing nature of law in contemporary British society. The vast
majority of law is no longer in the form of statutes; delegated
legislation is where the action is, and British courts have had a field
day striking down administrative decisions as contrary to the
"principles of natural justice"27 and, even more expansively,
"fairness. "28
Professor Hogg perceives bills/charters of rights as essentially
constraining of judicial activity - they adumbrate the legitimate limits

25
See for example, Lord Lloyd, Hansard, Vol. 396, cols. 1322-1324 (November 29th,
1978). In Somerset v. Stewart (1772), Lofft 1, 499, Lord Mansfield established that slavery was
inconsistent with English law.
26see J. Willis, "Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell" (1938) 16 Can. Bar Rev. l; Harry
Arthurs, "Rethinking Administrative Law" (1979) 17 Osgoode Hall L.J. l; Patrick McAuslan,
"Administrative Law, Collective Consumption and Judicial Policy" (1983) 46 M.L.R. l; for a
more applied example of juridico�political preference, see Patrick McAuslan, "The Ideologies
of Planning Caw" (1979) 2 Urban L. & Pol'y 1.
c. 5.
r

27Peter Cane, An Introduction to Administrative Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986)
28 Martin

Loughlin, "Procedural Fairness: A Study of the Crisis in Administrative La�
Theory" (1978) 28 U.T.L.J. 215.
More specifically, how does Hogg account for the preferences and inconsistencies
manifested by leading British decisions such as Roberts v. Hopwood [1925] A.C. 578, Prescott
v. Binningham Corporation [1955] Ch.210 (CA), Education Secretary v. Tameside Metropolitan
Borough Council [1976] 3 W.L.R. 641, Norwich C.C. v. Secretary of State for the Environment
[1982] 1 All E.R. 737 3W.L.R. 641, Bromley L.B.C. v G.L.C. [1982] 2 W.L.R. 62 (HL), R v.
London Transport Ex,ecutive, a parte G.L.C. [1983] 2 All E.R. 262, the "Son of Bromley" case:
Pickwell v. Camden London Borough Council [1983] Q.B. 962, Wheeler v. Leicester City Council
[1985] 3 W.L.R. 335 (HL).
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empowering, not constraining. Is the Constitution to be interpreted
as a rigid and hard red oak, or as a flexible willow? The metaphor
increases rather than delimits the horizons of judicial discretion.
Moreover, it soon breaks down, for the language of the Constitution,
unlike a tree, is not necessarily "natural"; language is socially
constructed, "fashioned by particular people for particular reasons at
a certain time."32
What appears "natural" in constitutional
interpretation is no more than a ,question of historically contingent,
conventional wisdom, a matter of choice, persuasion and/or power,
not the product of an oracular text.
That Hogg has faith in the constraining power of such a text
becomes apparent when we re'cognize the terms of his constitutional
discourse. A key word upon which his theory turns, is "apply." For
example, in the course of his reworking of the doctrine of "framers
intent" so that it can reinforce his theory of "progressive
interpretation," he claims that:
... it is at least equally plausible to attribute a quite different interpretive intent to
the framers ... that they were content to leave the detailed application of the
constitution to the courts of the future; that they were content that the process of
adjudication would apply the text in ways that could not be anticipated at the time
of drafting.33

Or again,
The doctrine of progressive interpretation is ... faithful to the constitutional text ...
based on the words of the constitution.... If general language is apt to apply to a
set of modern-day facts, then the doctrine of stipulates that the language should be
so applied.34

Hogg is indulging in the reification of language, infusing it
with a sanctity it does not possess, imposing upon it a burden which
it cannot bear. He negates its polysemantic and heterogeneous

32T. Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota

Press, 1983) at 11. Some would go much further and argue that everything we "know" is
socially constructed. Gary Peller argues that even the idea of a "tree" is not natural, but part
of a broader, contingent epistemological framework. ''The Metaphysics of American Law"
(1985) 73 Calif. L.Rev. 1151 at 1160-1170.

33

Hogg,

supra, note 2 at 96

34
Ibid. at 101.

r
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of the constitutional text.38 The ideal of a determinative text is a
chimera, and we are inevitably compelled to recognize that law, like
politics, is a matter of conviction and (rhetorical) power.39
At this point a brief example will help. In the pre-Charter
era, in theory, the Constitution Act, 1867'0 provided for the division
of powers within a federal state. Was this text determinative?
Could it provide correct, non-political, purely legal-constitutional
answers to social problems? A brief review of the criminal law
power suggests not. Section 91(27) provides that the federal
government is to have exclusive central control over criminal law.
What would have been the effect of applying the living tree doctrine
to this power? If taken seriously, it would probably have meant the
end of many, perhaps most, areas of provincial autonomy. But other
factors - primarily political - intervened to counterbalance this
interpretative dynamic and preserve the identity of the provinces.
Various sections of section 92 have been interpreted to curtail
federal hegemony in this realm. Thus the contradictions between
cases such as McNeil v. Nova Scotia Board of Censors41 and R. v.
Westend01p42 can be explained, in large part, by the political desires
of the judiciary to refashion the constitution in order to give effect
to their preferred political vision. It is no secret that many of
Laskin C.J.'s decisions clearly reflect his federalist bias.43 By the
38

Moreover, there are homologies between this "contemporary eyes" position and the
anachronistic "ordinary language" philosophers of the Oxford School.

,_

39
1 should perhaps point out that I do not advocate "hermeneutical anarchy," that
everything is up for grabs. There are constraints but they are to be located within the self
imposed myopia of the community of interpreters (lawyers) which, in turn, is dependent upon
their cultural context. Meaning is context bound but that context is potentially boundless.
(Katerina Clark & Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press,
1984) at 218-219). The constraints are political and sociological, not legal.
40

constitution Act 1867 (U.K.) 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3.

r

41

570.

(1978) 2 S.C.R. 662, 84 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 25 N.S.R. (2d) 128, 36 A.P.R. 128, 19 N.R.

42

(1983) 1 S.C.R. 43, (1983) 2 W.W.R. 386, 23 Alta L.R. (2d) 289, 32 C.R. (3d) 97, 2
C.C.C. (3d) 330, 46 N.R. 30, 41 AR. 306.
43
Katherine Swinton, "Bora Laskin and Federalism" (1985) 35 U.T.L.J. 353.
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On further reflection, Hogg's reference to Hunter v.
Southam47 only adds fuel to the funeral pyre for apolitical
interpretation. He uses this case to suggest that "purpose" helps add
flesh to the necessarily vague words of the Charter. He documents
how the court considered the protection of privacy to be the
purpose of section 8 a_nd this enabled them to determine the
meaning of unreasonable, and then concludes that "all this was
drawn from the single word 'unreasonable'."48 Once again, we are
involved in language games; the interpretation of section 8
articulated by the court in Hunter v. Southam is not drawn from but
rather imputed to the word "unreasonable." These slippery words do
not limit the judiciary, rather they provide them with supplementary
creative artillery to make political decisions in the guise of legal
deductionism. It is the judiciary who decide what the purpose of the
text means, they impute this meaning to the text and, supposedly, we
have the determinative legal answer. In short, purposes are as
manifestly indeterminate as the text: it all depends upon which level
of generality or abstraction the court chooses to articulate that
purpose. The approach is circular and self-fulfilling; the answers are
hidden in the questions asked.49 I agree with Professor Hogg when
he claims that "the ruling does not seem to go beyond the realm of
interpretation"50 but in view of the constitutively creative and
voluntaristic nature of interpretation, this is probably not the sort of
argument he wishes to make.51

47

(1984), 11 D,L,R. (4th) 641, [1984) 6 W.W.R. 577.

48

Hogg, supra, note 2 at 104.

,-

49
Professor Peck makes a similar point on a grander scale when he suggests that in
articulating what s.1 might mean the courts have provided themselves with even broader
resources with which to work. 'The Developing Analytical Framework For Decision-making
Under The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1.
SOHogg, supra, note 2 at 104.

51 In an excellent example of critical public law theory, Andrew Petter scratches the
surface of judicial discourse in Hunter v. Southam to articulate the unexpressed assumptions
and "taken for granted" animating the psyche of the court. See, "The Politics of The Charter"
(1986) 8 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 473.
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arguments has demonstrated that the text is inconclusive and can be
interpreted either way, depending upon which canons of
interpretation are adopted or which other sections of the Charter are
read in conjunction with section 32. Moreover, the lower courts
have provided conflicting decisions54 and the Supreme Court appears
to be thoroughly confused.55 This lack of consensus negates Hogg's
suggestion that we adopt the approach "which seems natural to
contemporary eyes."
Perhaps the principles of progressive and purposive
interpretation can provide greater elucidation. One version of a
progressive argument might be that section 32 should apply to the
private realm because it is clear from Canadian history that the
greatest threat t.o our rights and freedoms comes not from the state,
but from private centres of power.56 Moreover, as Slattery
demonstrates, there are even Canadian and Commonwealth
precedents for such an extensive approach.57 Yet such an approach
conflicts with Hogg's own interpretation of section 32, as expressed
elsewhere,58 where he categorically states that "The Charter of Rights
... does not regulate the relations between private persons and
private persons. Private action is therefore excluded from the
application of the Charter."59 Unfortunately, his reasons for such a
restrictive interpretation are of little help. First, Hogg draws upon
at 145.

54Re Klein and L.S. U.C. (1985), 16 D.L.R. (4th) 489 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Blainey v. Ontario
Hockey Association (1985), (1986] 52 O.R. (2d) 225, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 599, Steele J.; Re
Edmonton Journal and A.G.-for Alberta (1983), 4 C.C.C. (3d) 59, 4 C.R.R. 296 (Alta. Q.B.);
R v. Lerke (1984), 13 C.C.C. 515, 11 C.R.R. 1 (Alta. Q.8.).
55

rn Operation Dismantle, Dickson CJ., obiter, in reference to s.52 indicated that the
Charter might apply to the private realm, supra, note 14 at 459-60 but in Dolphin Delivery,
supra note 15, McIntyre J. suggested diverse and perhaps contradictory opinions.
56

see Devlin, supra, note 11; R. MacDonald, "Postscript and Prelude -- the Jurisprudence
of the Charter: Eight Theses" (1982) 4 Sup. Ct L. Rev. 321, at 347.

57
Supra, note 53 at 159-60.
58

constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 674-678.

59
Jbid. at 674.
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VI
Professor Hogg's paper attempts to guide our response and
that of the courts to the challenge of Charter interpretation. He has
attempted to answer the problem by developing an autochthonous,
culturally specific response that does not simply regurgitate one of
the "remedies" articulated by our southern peers. Unfortunately, his
proposals come perilously close to simply defining the problem out
of existence, to espousing jurisprudential closure. His central claim
is that the text, in and of itself, is capable of providing adequate
guidance to the judiciary so as to inhibit them from indulging in
arbitrary decision-making. My critique has been that he has failed to
develop the concept of constitutional text sufficiently to enable it to
support the constraining burden which he imposes upon it.
Affirmatively, I have posited the open-ended, promiscuous, and
perennially pregnant nature of the constitutional text, and suggested
the political machinations inherent in the deceptively innocent
interpretation. In short, it is suggested that the distinction between
adjudication and legislation is problematic and that the choices made
by the judiciary are, in effect, the same as those made by the
legislature.60
This comment is written with the (perhaps irrational) belief
that rational discourse can make a difference. I suggest that we
abandon the repressive61 and mystificatory potential of textual
fetishism which allows power to pose as truth; that we understand
60M.

Tushnet, "Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in
Deconstruction" (1983) 36 Stan. L.Rev. 623.

..

61

What Marcuse says about one-dimensional language is rather apt for contemporary
jurisprudential discourse:
The word becomes a cliche, and as a cliche governs speech or writing; the
communication thus precludes genuine development of meaning ... [T]he noun
governs the sentence in an authoritarian and totalitarian fashion, and the sentence
becomes a declaration to be accepted - it repels demonstration, qualification,
negation of its codified meaning ... [T]his language which constantly imposes images
,. militates against the development and expression of concepts. In its immediacy and
directness it impedes conceptual thinking, thus it impedes thinking.
One Dimensional Man, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964) at 184.

